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My name is David Michaels. I am an epidemiologist. I am currently Research Professor 
and Associate Chairman of the Department of Environmental and Occupational Health at 
The George Washington University School of Public Health, and Director of the Project 
on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP).  From 1998 to January 2001, I 
served as Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environment, Safety and Health, and was 
responsible for protecting the health of workers, communities and the environment 
around the nation’s nuclear weapons facilities. 
 
I am also the author of “Doubt is their Product: How Industry's Assault on Science 
Threatens Your Health,” which has just been published by Oxford University Press, in 
which I discuss in more detail many of the issues that the committees is focusing on 
today in this hearing.1  
 
I would like to thank Chairperson Boxer, Ranking Member Alexander and the other 
members of the committee for inviting me to testify today.  I am going to summarize my 
remarks and ask that my complete statement, and accompanying documents, be put into 
the record of this hearing. 
  
Scientific evidence is a critically important component in regulatory decisions. Our entire 
system of protecting the public’s health and environment is built on the foundational 
principle that regulatory agencies must base their decisions on the best science available. 
 
Sadly, the Bush administration has not embraced this principle; in fact, over the last 
seven years, the White House and political appointees in our regulatory agencies have 
turned this principle on its head.  Instead of using the best available science to guide 
policy decisions, they have ignored scientific experts, manufactured scientific 
uncertainty, and institutionalized changes that will damage our ability to protect human 
health and the environment.  
 
Science has become a victim of the Bush Administration.  In order to justify decisions to 
weaken regulatory actions, over and over again this administration has distorted the 
results of scientific studies and pretended that the effects of pollution and exposure to 
toxic chemicals are not well-enough understood to justify protecting the American public. 
This tactic, which I call “manufactured uncertainty,” was developed and applied most 
successfully by the tobacco industry.  The Bush Administration has embraced this 
technique, and built mechanisms into the federal regulatory process that encourage 
industries to manufacture uncertainty in order to slow progress on health protective 
regulations.  
 
Fortunately, the science community has been vocal in responding to the worst of these 
actions, and thankfully not all have been successful. But this administration’s actions 
have nonetheless damaged the system for developing and implementing public health 
protections, and threatened the health of Americans as a result. 
 
Before outlining what I think are three major components of the George W. Bush 
Administration’s anti-science agenda, it is valuable to revisit two science-related 
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controversies that arose early soon after the 2000 presidential election brought this 
Administration to power. Both involve the White House’s willingness to manipulate or 
ignore scientific evidence to justify its decisions to weaken environmental regulation.  
 
The first controversy involved arsenic.  Immediately after taking office, the G.W. Bush 
White House suspended an EPA regulation aimed at reducing the allowable level of 
arsenic, a known human carcinogen, in drinking water.  The regulation would have 
limited arsenic concentrations to the level recommended by the World Health 
Organization and already in effect in Europe.2  The administration raised questions about 
the science underlying the new regulations – it had to; if the science was right, drinking 
water with arsenic-contamination at levels permitted under the old standard would 
increase the risk of bladder, lung and skin cancer.  
 
Perhaps the administration did not expect the loud public outcry or the vehement 
response from the scientific community.  A few months later, the National Academy of 
Sciences issued a report underscoring the need for the more protective standard3 and the 
Bush Administration had to relent and re-issue the stronger standard.  
 
The second controversy involves climate change.  In his campaign for the presidency, 
George W. Bush promised to limit coal-burning power plants’ emissions of carbon 
dioxide, a leading greenhouse gas. Less than two months after taking office, the President 
reneged on that promise, and, for the last seven years, the administration has not only 
taken no meaningful action to reduce these emissions, but has attempted to block efforts 
by states to limit greenhouse gases.   
 
The first component of the Bush Administration’s approach to regulation that I would 
like to discuss is the widespread practice of ignoring scientific experts who identify 
environmental threats to public health. The issues facing the EPA are often complex, and 
the agency, and the entire federal government, needs the wisdom and advice of the 
nation’s best scientists. For decades, the government has used the federal advisory 
committee system to tap this wisdom. The Bush Administration has rejected this 
approach by either disbanding certain advisory panels, or by dropping renowned 
scientists and replacing them with scientists whose job it is to defend polluters and 
obstruct regulation.4  When there was protest in the scientific community, an HHS 
spokesperson bluntly stated that the secretary has the prerogative to solicit only advice he 
would want to hear.5   
 
In other instances, the administration chose to ignore or isolate advisory committees that 
could not be disbanded. An important example of this is the congressionally mandated 
Clean Air Science Advisory Committee (CASAC), a group of the nation’s pre-eminent 
scientists, appointed the Administrator of EPA.  Yet agency political leadership has 
ignored CASAC’s advice on recent proposals to prevent disease and disability caused by 
exposure to lead, ozone and particulate matter.  As a former regulator, I understand that 
scientific information is not the only driver of regulation, and agency leaders do not have 
to accept all analyses and recommendations by advisory committees.  EPA, however, has 
not disputed CASAC’s conclusions; instead, the EPA has elected to simply ignore its 
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own advisory panel, and issue weaker regulations.  To my knowledge, before 2006, 
CASAC had never written to an EPA Administrator complaining of the agency’s 
rejection of its finding. However, in September 2006, CASAC’s members sent a letter to 
EPA Administrator Johnson, asserting: 
 
(T)he Agency has rejected the CASAC’s expert scientific advice with regard to 
lowering the level of the annual primary fine particle (PM2.5) standard and 
establishing a new coarse particle (PM10-2.5) standard — both of which are 
consistent with the recommendations of the nationally-recognized science, 
medical and public health groups such as those cited above — and, in addition, 
EPA has not followed our advice in setting a separate secondary PM2.5 standard. 
We note that, since the CASAC’s inception in the late 1970s, the Agency has 
always accepted the Committee’s scientific advice with regard to final NAAQS 
[National Ambient Air Quality Standards] decisions. In view of this, we question 
whether you have appropriately given full consideration to CASAC’s expert 
scientific advice — obtained through open, public processes — in your final 
decisions on the PM NAAQS.6 
 
It is important to be very clear that examining in our nation’s administrative procedures 
for regulating hazardous materials is not merely an interesting exercise for academics or 
scientists. As we recognize in public health, statistics are simply people with the tears 
wiped away.  Exposure to air contaminants such as ozone and particulate matter kills 
thousands of Americans every year. In order to prevent these deaths and the untold 
illnesses that afflict many more, we must reduce exposure to these hazardous pollutants. 
EPA regulations are literally life or death decisions. 
 
The second anti-science component of the Bush Administration’s regulatory philosophy 
is its predilection to manufacturing scientific uncertainty. This involves manipulating, 
distorting or hiding the science, because this evidence is a most important driver of public 
policy decisions about environmental health.  Examples of distorted science abound. 
 
The most well-known was revealed in June 2005, when we learned from the front page of 
the New York Times and elsewhere that one Philip Cooney, chief of staff for the White 
House Council on Environmental Quality, edited a federal report on climate change to 
magnify the level of uncertainty. Suddenly the word “uncertainties” was preceded by 
“significant and fundamental.” Or consider the following sentence: “The attribution of 
the causes of biological and ecological changes to climate change or variability is 
extremely difficult.” Cooney added the “extremely.”7 While these were not policy 
documents, they exemplify the White House’s refusal to accept scientists’ overwhelming 
agreement about human-caused climate disruption. Instead, the White House voiced a 
position long championed by the fossil-fuel industries. This is not surprising, given 
Cooney’s background. Before his appointment by the President, Cooney was a lobbyist 
with the American Petroleum Institute, and immediately following the New York Times 
report he left the White House for a post at ExxonMobil.8 His job title may have changed, 
but his job description did not. 
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As late as June 2006, President Bush was still denying the significant role of human 
activity in global climate change.9 A few weeks later, when the U.S. Supreme Court was 
hearing arguments on a suit that was attempting to compel the EPA to regulate carbon 
dioxide as a pollutant, the administration argued that the EPA’s inaction was justified by 
the differences among scientists (specifically between those paid by the industry and 
everyone else). ‘‘I think one thing that we ought to be able to agree on,’’ asserted the 
deputy solicitor general, ‘‘is that there is uncertainty surrounding the phenomenon of 
global climate change.”10 
 
The scientific evidence is so powerful, and the popular acceptance of that evidence so 
pervasive, that it is no longer credible to manufacture uncertainty about the causes of 
global warming.  So the White House has moved on to manufacturing uncertainty about 
the public health impacts of severe climate change. This is a strategic retreat with the 
same objective: delay having to take any steps to reduce our use of fossil fuels. Call it 
Climate Change Uncertainty 2.0. 
 
I believe the members of this committee witnessed an example of this. In October of 
2007, CDC Director Julie Gerberding testified before the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee about climate change and public health. However, her testimony was 
severely edited by the White House, which cut it from12 pages to 6 and removed the 
pages that described the potential adverse health effects – including rising rates of 
asthma, heat stress, and some bacterial infections – that the U.S. can expect to see as the 
climate changes.11,12 It appears that while the Bush administration has realized that it is 
no longer possible to deny anthropogenic climate change, they will continue to block 
references to its effects until it becomes impossible to deny such findings.  
 
This refusal to accept findings that have strong scientific support but no absolute proof is 
exemplified in the secret documents revealed last week about the White House’s efforts 
to protect the shipping industry at the peril of the endangered North Atlantic Right 
Whale. 
 
During a process that began four years ago, NOAA's National Marine Fisheries Service 
developed a rule that would protect endangered North Atlantic right whales by slowing 
the speed at which ships can travel in some East Coast waters during certain times of 
year. Scientists have warned that the loss of just one more pregnant female could doom 
the species, whose current population is around 300. Since NOAA sent the rule to the 
OMB in February 2007, White House officials have been raising baseless objections that 
have delayed the rule’s enforcement – and in the meantime, two right whales have been 
seriously injured and another possibly killed by collisions with ships.13 
 
One particularly ludicrous challenge to the rule came from the office of Vice President 
Cheney, which according to NOAA “contends that we have no evidence (i.e., hard data) 
that lowering the speeds of "large ships" will actually make a difference.” In response, 
NOAA described the records and analyses that demonstrated vessel speed is a much 
better predictor of whale fate than vessel size, and pointed out that “There are no 
 5
experimental data … to establish the relationship of ship speed and size relative to injury 
to different species of whales.”14  
 
Christie Todd Whitman, the first head of the Environmental Protection Agency under 
President G. W. Bush, once said, “The absence of certainty is not an excuse to do 
nothing.”15 But, for this administration, it appears to serve as exactly that.  A basic tenet 
of public health and environmental regulation is that it must be made on the basis of the 
best available evidence. We cannot afford to wait until scientific certainty is reached 
because, in many cases, it cannot and will not be reached. In this example, it is likely the 
right whale would become extinct before the experimental data requested by the Vice 
President could be obtained.  
 
The third component  is what I call institutionalizing uncertainty. In the last few years, 
the White House has instituted a number of procedural changes governing the ways 
scientific information is produced, communicated, analyzed, synthesized and acted upon. 
I have no doubt that the objective of these measures is to limit the ability of future 
administrations to protect the public’s health and environment. 
 
Most recently, the Government Accountability Office documented a crisis in EPA’s 
Integrated Risk Information system (IRIS), which produces, in GAO’s words, “a database 
integral to the agency’s mission of protecting human health and the environment.” The 
nation needs the latest, most credible assessments of risks associated with chemical 
exposures. The IRIS system currently contains many outdated assessment, and each year, 
approximately 700 new chemicals enter commerce. As a result, for the IRIS system to be 
useful, it must be productive in developing and updating assessments. The GAO noted 
that in the last two years, the EPA has finalized only four assessments. The EPA actually 
sent many times that number of assessments to the White House’s Office of Management 
and Budget, but the OMB has failed to complete its review of them, thereby obstructing 
release of this hazard information to the public.16 
 
The IRIS program, as developed by the EPA, involves the public input of the top 
scientists in the country, and includes the opportunity for scientists working for 
manufacturers of the chemicals in question to make extensive comment on the work of 
the agency. In spite of this, over the past few years OMB has been requiring additional 
review for IRIS assessments, and last year it told EPA that a new interagency review 
process is required for all new assessments.  
 
In addition to heaping further delays onto an already extensive process, this new 
interagency review process gives OMB and other federal agencies that might be affected 
by IRIS assessment more power than EPA scientists when it comes to adding new 
assessments to the IRIS database. EPA must send draft assessments to OMB; OMB 
provides comments and questions to EPA from OMB and other federal agencies; and 
then EPA revises the assessments to address those comments and provides OMB with a 
document describing how it has addressed each issue that was raised. Only after OMB 
verbally informs EPA that all issues are resolved (to OMB’s satisfaction) can EPA send 
the assessments for external peer review. 
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To agencies like the Department of Defense (DoD), protecting human health and the 
environment is not a primary concern. DoD is concerned with national security first and 
foremost, and as a general rule oppose efforts to force them to clean up toxic waste. At 
interagency meetings, the Pentagon advocates for its needs, and the needs of its 
contractors, many of whom are responsible for the accumulation of huge quantities of 
toxic waste near military bases.  DoD scientists currently are welcome to participate in 
the public process in which scientists comment on proposed IRIS assessments.  The new 
structure will give those agencies who clearly oppose more protective standards the 
opportunity to challenge EPA’s science in secrecy, so the public and the scientific 
community can’t even monitor what’s going on. 
 
We would never permit a structure which would allow the EPA, in secret, to delay 
military activities; why should we permit a system in which DoD, in secret, has the 
ability to block EPA efforts to protect human health and the environment?  
 
But this is only the most recent example of efforts by the White House to install systems 
to handcuff regulatory agencies, particularly the EPA. This is being accomplished though 
requirements that  submit more decisions and products into processes, some open and 
others hidden, that allow conflicted parties the opportunity to influence the agencies’ 
work. 
 
Fortunately, the science community has spoken loudly and forcefully against some of the 
Bush Administration’s efforts, and as a result, the processes that have been put into place 
are somewhat less onerous than those originally proposed by the White House. One 
striking example was an attempt to require onerous reviews of nearly every form of 
technical or scientific information produced by federal agencies. These requirements 
were described as peer review, but Donald Kennedy, former editor in chief of Science, 
made it clear that he did not think what OMB proposed should even be called peer 
review.17 After objections from, among other organizations, The National Academy of 
Sciences and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the White 
House issued peer review guidelines that were less burdensome to agencies. The 
deleterious effects of the guidelines are still significant, however, severely delaying 
important public health efforts. 
 
Parenthetically, it has recently been revealed that Philip Morris, the tobacco giant, was 
the driving force behind the legislation authorizing these new requirements in an obscure 
appropriations rider called the Data Quality Act.  This was just one of several successes 
of the cigarette manufacturer’s ‘‘Sound Science Project’’ aimed specifically at the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s attempts to classify secondhand tobacco smoke as a 
carcinogen.18 
 
A second example of institutionalizing uncertainty was the recent attempt by the White 
House to compel agencies to follow a one-size-fits-all risk assessment model that was 
clearly aimed at making pollution and toxic chemicals appear less hazardous in EPA risk 
assessments.   A panel chosen by the National Academy of Sciences evaluated the 
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proposal and, in what I think may be an unprecedented statement, advised the White 
House not to attempt to improve the proposal, but instead, kill it entirely because it was 
so ill-advised. Here are two excerpts from the NAS panel’s evaluation:  
Overall, the committee concludes that the potential for negative impacts on the 
practice of risk assessment in the federal government…would be very high if the 
currently proposed bulletin were implemented.  
and 
On the basis of its review, the committee concludes that the OMB bulletin is 
fundamentally flawed and recommends that it be withdrawn.19 
*     *     *     *     * 
Through federal regulations, our nation has made great progress in reducing toxic 
exposures and protecting the public’s health. That progress must not stop, because much 
remains to be done. 
 
In the not too distant future, I am hopeful that the political leadership responsible for our 
public health and environment will be committed to the independent scientific evaluation 
of the risks posed by carbon emissions, air pollutants, lead, mercury and countless other 
toxic chemicals. 
 
When this happens, we will surely view the activities of the current White House and the 
political leadership of the EPA with the same dismay and outrage with which we now 
look back on the deceits Big Tobacco perpetrated. But by then, the price already paid in 
preventable illnesses and premature deaths, in destroyed habitats and extinct species, will 
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